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ABSTRACT
Using existing international databases that track disaster occurrence and humanitarian 
costs, this research attempts to improve understanding of how climate change may affect 
international humanitarian spending.  Employing four distinct methodological approaches, 
a range of potential impact scenarios is developed.  The findings indicate that climate 
change will have a significant impact on humanitarian costs and the increase could range 
from a 32% increase, taking into account only changes in frequency of disasters, to upwards 
of a 1600% increase when other criteria, such as intensity, are also taken into account.  
Further, the report highlights that extreme weather events do not occur in isolation and 
the increasing interconnectedness of world economic and political systems has made 
disasters more complex and destructive.  The report makes a number of recommendations, 
including the need for more rigorous and systematic collection of disaster-related data and 
more constructive interaction between the humanitarian and climate change communities 
on future research, planning, and action.
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 MAIN REPORTi 
Why This Topic Is Important 
Natural disastersii affected on average more 
than 250,000,000 people per year in the past 
decade.iii A closer look at these data indicates that 
the global number of people affected has been 
increasing steadily, by an estimated 50,000 to 
60,000 people per decade, since the early 1970s.  
The number of reported disasters has also in-
creased year on year, from an average annual total 
of 90 in the 1970s, to a figure close to 450 per 
year in this present decade.  At the same time, the 
number of people killed by natural disasters has, 
on average, decreased, dropping from a decade 
annual average of approximately 99,000 in the 
1970s to a low of 66,000 per year this decade.  
Natural disasters matter. They directly destroy 
lives, as reflected in the disaster fatality rates, and 
they devastate and wreak havoc on livelihoods, 
with long term consequences, as suggested by the 
disaster-affected numbers. 
Other than earthquake and tsunami events, all 
natural disasters are triggered by weather-related 
phenomena: drought, floods, cyclones and high 
winds, and extreme heat and extreme cold events.  
Extreme events do not cause disasters. In fact, 
while we use the term natural disasters through-
out the report, this term is misleading. Natural 
disasters are triggered by extreme natural phe-
nomena and become disasters because of the 
vulnerability of the people and places where they 
occur—what currently constitutes a disaster, with 
appropriate preparedness and risk reduction 
efforts, need not be a disaster in the future.  An 
extreme weather event needs vulnerable people to 
act upon, people whose livelihood systems are 
insufficiently robust to withstand the extra shock. 
Thus, residents in London survived the severe 
flooding of 2000-1 because of the Thames barrier 
and the payout from flood insurance and other 
livelihood adaptations,iv but the subsistence 
farmers on the Mekong delta were less lucky, 
seeing most of their assets washed away, and with 
them, years’ worth of building flood-resistant 
livelihoods. 
People’s vulnerability to extreme natural 
events is a product of economics, politics, and 
location—we will comment more on this later.  
But it is the climate, and its daily projection as 
weather, that provides the hazards that act upon 
that vulnerability.  
This research and resulting paper were 
commissioned by the Policy Development and 
Studies Branch of the United Nations Office for 
the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN 
OCHA), supported by the Red Cross/Red 
Crescent Climate Centre and the International 
Strategy for Disaster Reduction (ISDR) Secre-
tariat, as an explicit input into the December 
2008 round of UNFCCC meetings, in Poznan, 
Poland, in order to raise awareness of the disaster 
Figure 1. The recent rise in number of disasters Figure 2. The number of people  
affected by recent disasters(Source: CRED EM-DAT)
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consequences of climate change.
The research focuses on two issues: estimating 
the consequences of climate change for the cost 
of necessary humanitarian operations, and explor-
ing the more complex humanitarian consequenc-
es of climate-related changes in disaster patterns.
To date, very little quantitative work has been 
done explicitly seeking relationships between 
spending on humanitarian relief and disaster type, 
location, and year of occurrence. General research 
has been presented in the past, most notably in the 
annual World Disasters Reports,v but more work 
is needed to identify trends and generate reason-
able projections of future costs, particularly in 
light of the potential effects of climate change. We 
hope this paper will go some way, as an early step, 
to rectifying this and to providing factual evidence 
upon which to make future projections and 
decisions.  
Additionally, most authors have focused solely 
on the direct disaster consequences of extreme 
weather events.  We want to go beyond that, 
believing that, in an increasingly complex world, 
the propensity for extreme weather events to 
interact with political and economic processes to 
cause much larger and more complex emergen-
cies than expected needs to be spelled out. 
Drought in the 1970s in Ethiopia led to famine, 
which also contributed to the overthrow of 
centuries of imperial rule.vi Flooding from 
Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans devastated 
people’s assets and livelihoods in a matter of days, 
but it has also led to a profound change in the 
demographics of the city.vii
This paper represents a starting point in a 
research process.  We hope people will use this 
work to raise awareness within the UNFCCC of 
the importance of acknowledging the potential 
humanitarian cost of climate change and of the 
value of investing in disaster preparedness.  We also 
hope that the scarcity of data on this subject will 
stimulate others to propose further research, and 
yet others to fund such research.  Advances in 
research and information on this topic will enable 
planning for the future to be based upon evi-
dence, not simply ideology or speculation. 
Background: What Does History Tell Us?
History, old and recent, tells us that climate 
change and vulnerability will combine to cause 
not only simple, immediate disasters but more 
long-reaching, complex ones.  
Brooksviii has shown how climate change in 
the mid-Holocene period in the Sahara led 
pastoralists and hunter-gatherers to fall back to 
environmental “refuges” which in turn became 
some of the world’s first urban settlements.  In a 
2007 publication, Zhang and co-authors analyzed 
paleo-climate data for northern Europe and 
China.  Their research found significant correla-
tions between cycles of temperature change, war, 
food production, and population totals.  In their 
words, “the findings suggest that worldwide and 
synchronistic war–peace, population, and price 
cycles in recent centuries have been driven mainly 
by long-term climate change.”ix Using more 
recent data, from 1950 to 2000, Nel and Righarts 
showed that “natural disasters significantly increase 
the risk of violent civil conflict both in the short 
and medium term, specifically in low- and 
middle-income countries that have intermediate 
to high levels of inequality, mixed political re-
gimes, and sluggish economic growth.”x
Since then, further research has also supported 
assertions that the economic and political stress 
caused by increasing and repeated natural disasters 
leads to increased civil unrest, resultant conflict, 
and often reactive violent oppression.xi A commu-
nity that is already under economic and political 
stress may tip from survival to collapse under the 
impact of extreme weather events and the increas-
ing vulnerability of its population. Understanding 
the potential effects of climate change on disasters 
in the future will provide one lens through which 
to better understand these complex linkages.    
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 Background: Our Present State  
Of Knowledge
The Fourth Assessment Report of the Inter-
governmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) 
asserts that, regardless of the different emissions 
scenarios, the planet is committed to 0.2 degrees 
(C) per decade of warming for the first part of 
this century due to pre-existing emissions of 
greenhouse gases.xii The report examines the 
historical coupling of climate change and weath-
er-related hazards and includes regional projec-
tions that hint at the change in frequency and 
intensity of these hazards, or “extreme events,” 
which in turn trigger humanitarian crises and 
disasters. The IPCC report does not, however, 
contain disaster predictions.  
In 2006, Disasters Journal produced a special-
issue edition focusing on climate change and 
disasters.  In their editorial introduction to the 
edition, Helmer and Hilhorst highlight four 
critical findings from the nine papers that make 
up the volume.xiii First, it is not the slow change of 
climate that we should be worried about, but the 
possibility of increased frequency and scale of 
severe weather events.  It is these extreme events 
which trigger disasters.  Second, policymakers, at 
least in the short term, will not stop climate 
change, so they need to focus on disaster vulner-
ability.  Third, it is therefore critical to understand 
vulnerability to disasters.  Vulnerability is a human 
process, albeit a complex one, thus it is within our 
power to alter it.  Environmental change, conflict, 
poor health, poverty, and political exclusion are all 
part of the complexity that makes up vulnerability. 
The effects of extreme weather events will be 
filtered through these lenses.  Finally, and sadly, 
most of our international, and many of our 
national, institutional arrangements for addressing 
climate change, disasters, and development act in 
glorious isolation from each other, politically, 
financially, and administratively. These recent 
papers and others, such as Andrew Dlugolecki’s 
2007 report to the UNFCCC,xiv leave us with 
four critical questions to answer.
First, for defined time periods and geographi-
cal locations, what will climate change do to the 
frequency and scale of extreme weather events? 
We have data, for a few locations and a few time 
periods, but nothing close to enough.  In this 
present study, we are therefore looking at aggre-
gated periods.  In part of our analysis, we look 
sixteen years into the past—the only continuous 
period for which a robust global disaster response 
data set exists—and twenty-two years into the 
future, long enough to average out some of the 
noise of natural variation but short enough to be 
relevant to policymakers. 
Second, how is vulnerability to disasters likely 
to change over the coming decades?  Vulnerability 
is context-specific.  All we are learning about how 
communities react to and adapt to stress tells us 
that local history, economy, politics, and social 
change combine with national and international 
drivers to make up vulnerability.xv At this point, 
any attempt to project trends in vulnerability on a 
national basis, let alone a regional one, is pure 
speculation.  So, for the quantitative parts of this 
study, we assume that vulnerability remains 
constant.
Third, how will increasing hydro-meteorolog-
ical hazards and vulnerability combine to give us 
future disasters? Whilst we cannot answer this in 
detail, we do know that the combination will not 
be a simple one.  It will bring about unexpected 
results.  It will combine with other existing stresses 
(political, economic, or military, for example).  It 
will lead to cascades of secondary effects.  This is 
the inherent nature of a complex system.  We will 
explore this set of possible consequences in the 
section on Complexity and Climate Change.
Fourth, so what? Faced with the evidence, the 
speculation and the risks, how can and should 
institutions concerned with humanitarian re-
sponse react?  This question we will address in the 
concluding section of this paper.
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Data And Methodology 
Data Sources
Our historical data were drawn from three 
main sources that, on various levels, track disasters 
and the international communities’ response to 
them. 
The first data source is UN OCHA’s Finan-
cial Tracking Service (FTS).xvi This is a real-time 
database that compiles reports of international aid 
in response to emergencies, including data from 
the UN, NGO, Red Cross/Red Crescent Move-
ment, bilateral aid, in-kind aid, and private 
donations.  Since 2000, FTS has tracked humani-
tarian appeals—typically flash appeals and consoli-
dated appeals, in the UN parlance—and their 
corresponding donations. Some appeals include 
figures on the number of people affected and the 
number of intended beneficiaries, but this infor-
mation is not included in a systematic manner.  
With data going back to 1992, FTS also provides 
a report of general donations in response to 
natural disasters, even when an appeal was not 
issued.  Appeals have not been issued for all 
emergencies.  In addition, the difference between 
the appeal issued and the amount funded high-
lights some of the difficulty in determining the 
actual humanitarian cost of disasters where appeal 
data are not available.  The challenge of data 
consistency in calculating the true cost of human-
itarian crises is addressed below.
The International Federation of Red Cross 
and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) maintains a 
Disaster Management Information Systemxvii 
(DMIS) that tracks its humanitarian appeals and 
expenditures.  The DMIS was the second source 
of data for this paper.  IFRC has compiled data 
since 1919.  It includes information on disasters 
until mid-2005.  Appeals from 2005-2008 are 
available on the IFRC website, but data on the 
international response to these later appeals are 
not consistently available.  One advantage of the 
IFRC data is the systematic inclusion of the 
intended number of beneficiaries for any given 
appeal.  With this information, we were able to go 
beyond looking at the cost per type and location 
of emergency and explore the average cost of a 
disaster per beneficiary. 
A third source of data was the International 
Emergency Disasters Databasexviii (EM-DAT), 
compiled by CRED at the University of Louvain.  
The database contains data since 1900 on the 
occurrence of disasters.  In addition to listing over 
16,000 disasters, EM-DAT includes figures on the 
number of people affected by an emergency.  Data 
from EM-DAT provide an overview of all report-
ed disasters, not just those for which there was a 
UN or IFRC appeal.  It therefore provides a more 
complete picture, but still one that is a subset of 
the total number of disasters.  If the disaster is not 
reported in the international community, from at 
least two sources, it is not included in EM-DAT. 
The dataset does, however, allow us to make a 
tentative comparison of disasters appealed for as a 
percent of total disasters reported.  EM-DAT does 
not include any data on financial response to 
disasters.
Methodology
Understanding climate change’s impact on 
humanitarian costs is a relatively new research 
area. Our research used four exploratory models 
to project future humanitarian costs as related to 
climate change:
1) Projecting frequency of future disasters
In model one, we developed a three-part 
methodology that aimed to understand current 
disaster occurrence and costs, estimate future 
hazards and extreme weather events, and overlay 
this information to hypothesize about possible 
future occurrence and cost of events.  We focused 
our analysis on four regions: Central America, East 
Africa, South Asia, and Southeast Asia.xix The 
regions were chosen on the basis of the high 
frequency of natural disasters and the diversity of 
potential climate change effects.  Using these data 
sources, we built a database of disaster events since 
1992 in the four specific regions, with corre-
sponding information about these events, includ-
ing country, date, type of disaster, and, when 
available, UN appeal amount, IFRC appeal 
amount, amount contributed, number of people 
affected, and number of intended beneficiaries.xx 
These data provided the foundation of our 
analysis of costs of disasters in the past and  
currently.xxi 
In the absence of hard forecasts from the 
IPCC, we constructed three extreme-event 
occurrence projections (low, medium, and high) 
based upon the expected 0.2 degree-per-decade 
warming during the period of analysis.  We liaised 
with six leading climate scientists to develop three 
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potential scenarios for the impact of climate 
change in each of the selected regions.  The 
scenarios estimated a low, medium, and high 
impact (as a percentage change) on frequency of 
disasters through the year 2030.  To derive disaster 
cost estimates for the period 2009-2030, we made 
a linear extrapolation from our research on 
current cost and frequency within each region.  
Specifically, we calculated the average annual 
frequency for each type of disaster in each of the 
four regions.  Next, we multiplied this new figure 
by the percent change for each scenario to receive 
low, medium, and high frequency values for 2030.  
To estimate the amount of contributions in 2030 
for each type of disaster, we multiplied the region-
specific average cost of the disasters by their 
projected 2030 frequency value.  Finally, we added 
the total contributions for all of the disaster types 
across all four regions for each of the three 
scenarios in order to arrive at low, medium, and 
high estimates for total contributions in 2030.
2) Projecting intensity of future cyclones 
and floods
In model two, once we determined low, 
medium, and high disaster frequency scenarios, we 
attempted to account for changes in the intensity 
of extreme events.  As was the case when predict-
ing frequency, we faced both gaps and a great deal 
of uncertainty in the literature on climate change 
and extreme event intensity.  That said, the state of 
research on intensity of cyclone impact was such 
that we could include a scenario that accommo-
dated the expected increase in cyclone intensity 
on humanitarian contributions.  By drawing upon 
research that correlates extreme precipitation 
events with warmer temperatures, we then 
modified our flood-spending prediction accord-
ingly.  We found that there is not enough evidence 
to project intensity of future droughts or other 
events; therefore this model only includes cy-
clones and floods.
3) Projecting total international spending 
on disasters 
Our third model aimed to move beyond 
specific regions and better understand total 
international spending on disasters.  For this 
model, we used the IFRC-DMIS database, as it 
has the most consistent global spending data of all 
the data bases available.  We explored the relation-
ship between total spending on humanitarian 
response and total spending on hydro-meteoro-
logical disasters—those we expect to be directly 
impacted by climate change.  As Figure 12 shows, 
the trend over the past generation is actually 
towards less spending on climate-related disasters, 
both as a percentage of total spending and in 
absolute terms!  Interpreting this trend, though, is 
problematic.  The categorization of disaster 
appeals from the IFRC has not remained con-
stant.  From 1990 onward, we see a new category 
of appeal, “socio-economic,” appearing in the data 
set along with “mixed regional programs.”  Also, 
since around 2000, we see annual appeals, rather 
than specific disaster-related appeals, appearing in 
the database.  We have no way of telling from 
these data if contributions to a socio-economic 
appeal are to help long-term victims of flooding, 
civil war, or population displacement.  Therefore, 
we do not believe this analysis, in the end, turns 
out to be as useful as the other three models.
4) Projecting future disaster occurrence and 
affected populations
Finally, using the EM-DAT database, our 
fourth model aimed to project occurrence and 
the number of people affected by disasters.  
Starting with the total number of climate-related 
disasters recorded and people affected per year, we 
did a regression analysis based on occurrences 
between 1975 and 2008.  Climate-related disasters 
were defined as those recorded in the EM-DAT 
database as drought, extreme temperature, flood, 
storm, or wildfire.  We then projected these trend 
lines to 2030 using both a linear best-fit projec-
tion and an exponential best-fit projection.  
Figures 13 and 14 illustrate these findings.  Statis-
tically, for this data, these two methods provided 
very similar degrees of explanation of the data 
spread and so could be regarded as equally 
probable projections.  In this model, we cannot 
separate out the possible causes of the trends 
observed.  They may reflect increases in climate-
related hazards, or increases in vulnerability to 
these hazards, or even simply better reporting of 
disasters. Our assumption is that most of the 
observed change in the past generation is due to 
actual changes in the frequency and severity of 
disasters.
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Ifs, Buts, And Caveats
In carrying out this research, a critical finding 
is that, for a profession that deals every day in 
life-and-death decisions and the allocation of 
scarce resources, there is a stunning paucity of 
rigorous data upon which to judge the efficiency, 
effectiveness, and impact of humanitarian re-
sponse.  To generate truly significant results, one 
would need historical data that accurately traced 
the frequency and severity/intensity of hydro-
meteorological disasters, their correlation with 
extreme events, and the cost per beneficiary for 
each disaster type and region.  In addition, one 
would need climate data on extreme events 
predicted through 2030; currently, the majority of 
the IPCC projections compare climate trends 
from 1980-1999 to 2080-2099, making it difficult 
to estimate the frequency of these events during 
the shorter time frame of only the next few 
decades.  
We have no reliable record of the true 
frequency and severity of disaster occurrence.  
Some countries (but not all) keep their own 
databases of disasters, but do not use a common 
methodology or terminology. 
The EM-DAT database is the only compre-
hensive database, but it has severe limitations.  
First, it is held and compiled by a private non-
governmental organization and relies upon 
voluntary funding, thus its continued existence is 
fragile.  Second, no state sources are obliged to 
report to it.  It gathers disaster information from 
media reports, the reports of aid agencies, and 
other publicly available sources.  Small disasters 
and localized not-reported disasters fail to appear.  
Third, the figures in the database for the numbers 
of people affected by a disaster are based upon 
numbers publicly reported, but there is no 
standard or rigorous methodology behind what is 
reported.  EM-DAT passes on the “affected 
population” information reliably, but we can say 
nothing confidently about what these figures 
mean.  We cannot compare, for instance, what 
100,000 people affected in Vietnam means when 
compared with 100,000 people affected in 
Jamaica, the United States, or Sudan. 
Lastly, in this paper we have assumed business-
as-usual adaptation supported by current levels of 
funding under the UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol 
regime.  The UNFCCC has estimated that USD 
28-67 billion will be needed annually by 2030 
and the World Bank estimates that USD 10-40 
billion per year is needed for adaptation; current 
spending, however, is only USD 0.515 billion per 
year and the funds accrued by the Kyoto Proto-
col’s Adaptation Fund are expected to fall far short 
of these estimates.xxii Currently, many of the 
activities that are recognized as “climate change 
adaptation” are also measures that reduce disaster 
risk.  Thus, if agreement is reached in Copenha-
gen on a robust adaptation mechanism, we will 
have overestimated the number and severity of 
disasters.
Humanitarian Cost 
It is difficult to define what criteria should be 
used to determine the actual cost of a disaster.  
Theoretically, one could measure: the total 
reported insured losses; the total financial value of 
all assets lost which can be directly attributed to 
the disaster; the total value of all assets lost plus 
lost income and productivity during the disaster; 
or, all the above plus future losses yet to be 
realized as a result of income not earned by those 
who are dead or injured.  Alternatively, one could 
focus on the cost to the humanitarian agencies to 
provide assistance.  This approach is also ambigu-
ous as one can measure, as we did, the financial 
cost of what international agencies report they 
spend on each disaster (the most commonly 
available figures),xxiii the value of what they appeal 
for (but often don’t get) to respond to disasters, or 
the value of the international response, plus the 
national response (which is only occasionally 
published), plus the value of the spontaneous local, 
including private sector, response (which is hardly 
ever calculated, but significant in aggregate).
For the purposes of this report, we have gone 
with data available, namely, the international 
reported cost to humanitarian agencies of re-
sponding to disasters, but we hope the point is 
well made that we can say nothing definitive 
about how this relates to any calculation of the 
true cost of all disasters to those who survive 
them and have to rebuild their livelihoods. 
Caveats On Predictions
In concert with the IPCC’s Fourth Assess-
ment Report, we have assumed 0.2 degrees (C) of 
warming per decade through 2030 for methods 
one and two.  The global circulation climate 
models cited by the IPCC predict that surface air 
temperatures will rise by 0.64 to 0.69 degrees (C) 
between 2011-2030 compared to the period of 
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1980-1990.xxiv The amount of warming, predicted 
to vary from region to region and within regions, 
is incorporated into our estimates of extreme 
event frequency.  We attempted to avoid a damp-
ening of intraregional variability by projecting 
changes in disaster frequency within regions.  
However, some dampening still exists.  In East 
Africa, for example, drought risk may be decreas-
ing in some parts of the region while increasing in 
others.
With regard to warming, we have also 
assumed a continuation of existing trends with no 
“abrupt changes” such as those that could result 
from the crossing of a climate threshold.  One 
such climate surprise was the sudden collapse of 
the Wilkins ice sheet in Antarctica last year.xxv And, 
though unlikely, the predicted amount of warm-
ing might also underestimate the amount of 
methane released into the atmosphere due to the 
thawing of permafrost or increased warming due 
to loss of albedo from the faster-than-expected 
melting of ice in the Arctic. 
The traditional definition of climate involves 
a thirty-year average (for temperature, precipita-
tion, etc.) in a given locale; climate change is 
typically measured by comparing two or more 
thirty-year averages.  Thus, the period considered 
for parts of this paper, from 1992-2030, raises 
another limitation.  For such a brief period of 
time, it is difficult to distinguish extreme hydro-
meteorological events associated with climate 
change from those caused by natural climate 
variability or other processes such as the El 
Niño-Southern Oscillation (ENSO) and Pacific 
Decadal Oscillation.
We have examined a scenario of climate 
change impacts on top of natural variability, rather 
than produced a prediction of actual hazards at a 
particular point in time.  By basing our analysis on 
extreme events, we have focused on the tail end of 
the distribution, where there is a great deal of 
uncertainty.
There is a significant possibility that we have 
underestimated the number and magnitude of 
future disasters, for two reasons.  The first, as 
Dlugolecki noted, is that “[global climate model] 
projections of extreme events are sparse; they are 
averaged across large regions often, which con-
ceals significant sub-regional effects; they find it 
difficult to discriminate a climate signal from 
underlying natural variability, which is high; they 
are not designed to explore the effects of ex-
tremes, yet damage varies strongly in a nonlinear 
way as the intensity of a climate variable rises.”xxvi 
Our estimation of cyclone disasters was compli-
cated by the fact that recent research on tropical 
storm frequency suggests a decrease in the overall 
number of storms but an increase in the number 
of intense tropical cyclones.xxvii Dlugolecki 
observes that the IPCC’s own “projections 
concerning extreme events in the tropics remain 
uncertain.  The difficulty in projecting the distri-
bution of tropical cyclones adds to this uncertain-
ty,” and “research on changes in extremes specific 
to Africa, in either models or observations, is 
limited.”xxviii If we had adopted the “high” sce-
nario from Dlugolecki’s report, a 70.7% increase 
from 2003-2030, our estimates would increase by 
nearly 50%.
The second reason that our initial estimates in 
method one are likely too conservative derives 
from the fact that we assumed a linear relationship 
between extreme events and disasters.  For 
example, if we double the number of extreme 
events, we will double the number of disasters.  
This is a reasonable first approximation, but that is 
all it is.  Many scientists believe that, in the case of 
cyclones, for example, this relationship between 
intensity and impact is at least cubed.  Consider 
the commonly used equation to express relation-
ship between cyclone intensity and damages: D = 
xWy, where D is damage, W wind speed, and x 
and y are constants.  Studies of hurricane damage 
from 1900-2005 found a value of y to be 3.9.xxix 
Other scientists believe that the value of y is 
greater still.  What’s more, climate scientists predict 
that intensity of cyclones may increase by as much 
as 18 percent by 2050.  
On the other hand, some of our conservative 
underestimates will be offset due to “double 
counting,” because disaster frequency during our 
baseline period of 1992-2008 was also affected by 
climate change.  In short, we have estimated a per-
cent increase in frequency on top of pre-existing 
climate change.
Lastly, because this paper includes only 
disasters for which there was international report-
ing and response, we have filtered out of our 
baseline period the smaller disasters that were 
responded to domestically.  There is evidence that 
these smaller disasters are increasing in frequency 
even more quickly than the larger disasters.  
Cumulatively, the increase in frequency of disas-
ters, large or small, is likely to wear down coping 
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mechanisms and decrease the coping capacity of 
those affected by disasters over time.  
Caveats On Cost 
We have assumed that the cost of responding 
to disasters increases linearly with their num-
ber—a reasonable starting assumption.  There are 
two things to consider here.
First, disasters are the combined effect of 
hazard and vulnerability. Our analysis is unable to 
say anything about changing vulnerability.  Sec-
ond, will states continue to respond to humanitar-
ian crises as they do today, with the same ad-hoc, 
post-disaster voluntary-funded system?  For a 
national and international agency like the IFRC, 
will the relationship between the numbers of 
people needing assistance and the number it 
provides for remain constant?  In the absence of 
any evidence for a change in the political and 
policy environment which determines funding, 
we have assumed a status quo projection.
At present, bush fires, heat waves, cold snaps, 
and ice storms do not figure heavily in the 
response data bases.  Approximately six humani-
tarian appeals have been issued for these types of 
events in the time period on which we focused. 
There are not enough data to provide us with 
meaningful average or median cost figures, but 
international contributions for four extreme fire 
events in Southeast Asia totaled more than USD 
30,650,000.  In the future, heat waves in Europe 
and wildfires in Southeast Asia and the United 
States may become sufficiently frequent and 
severe to appreciably affect the volume of human-
itarian response and hence cost,xxx but, without a 
baseline from which to project, we cannot, using 
this paper’s methodology, make any meaningful 
projections of their potential future costs.
Where possible, we have excluded from our 
analysis the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami and its 
response.  This disaster, in its size, nature, and scope 
of response, is so far off the scale that its inclusion 
in the database distorts all calculations of what is 
“normal” or to be “expected,” but such infrequent 
and extreme events are a reality.  Whilst tsunamis 
are unlikely to be triggered by climate change, 
other extreme events, for example, massive 
flooding in Bangladesh caused by a combination 
of sea-level rise and increased storm intensity and 
frequency, are a possibility as are more Hurricane 
Katrina-like events, but we have no basis on 
which to say anything conclusive about these 
unknown unknowns.
One of the most infuriating phrases econo-
mists use in their projections is “all other things 
being equal” because we know, with the bright 
eyes of hindsight, that all other things are not 
equal.  We use this excuse-phrase when our 
models and the data they are based upon are 
simply too rudimentary to make meaningful 
predictions which we are confident will coincide 
with reality.  So, instead, we make projections.  
Often, we simply do not have the data or the 
models to do anything more meaningful than 
make simple linear projections.  These projections 
are still useful for they help us think about what 
changes we might have to make to the way we 
predict, mitigate, and respond to disasters.  They 
show us what will happen if we go on with 
business as usual, but do not make the mistake of 
assuming they show us what the future will be.  
They do not!
Disaster Events And Humanitarian 
Spending Today
Since 1992, nearly USD 2.7 trillion has been 
spent on international response to cyclones, 
floods, and droughts in the regions on which we 
have focused our research.  Using the data that we 
were able to compile, we aimed to deconstruct 
this total in order to better understand the costs of 
humanitarian assistance.  Through understanding 
what is currently spent on natural disaster re-
sponse, we will better be able to speculate poten-
tial humanitarian costs due to a change in the 
occurrence and/or intensity of future natural 
disasters.  
We found that the amount of resources 
committed to humanitarian response varies 
greatly from region to region, and between the 
types of emergencies.  For example, between 1992 
and 2008, the average total contributions to 
respond to a cyclone in Central America were 
USD 61,991,759, compared with USD 
11,677,390 in Southeast Asia and USD 
18,383,288 in South Asia.  In East Africa, the 
average total contributions per drought were USD 
28,446,859, compared with USD 5,580,599 in 
Central America.  This supports earlier research 
from CRED that found that the “allocation of 
humanitarian aid does not seem to be clearly 
linked to the magnitude of human needs . . . 
donors seem to show preferences for certain types 
of disasters over others.”xxxi Further, the research-
ers found that spectacular, acute events, which 
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often receive the most media attention, also 
receive the most international emergency funding. 
It is important to note that differences in funding 
might also be impacted by asset values per region, 
urban/rural impacted areas, the level of develop-
ment, etc.  As the figures below representing data 
from FTS demonstrate, there is significant varia-
tion in contributions when we organized data 
around types of emergencies and regions. 
Figure 7. The global picture  
on present humanitarian costs
FIGURE SET: Average $ contributions per type of emergency in four regions
Figure 3. Central America humanitarian costs Figure 4. East Africa humanitarian costs
Figure 5. South Asia humanitarian costs Figure 6. Southeast Asia humanitarian costs
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funded on average, with the average appeal 
requesting USD 44,799,538.  If one were to 
gauge cost by the amount requested in the 
appeals, then the average numbers would be that 
much greater. 
Estimating Average Cost Per Beneficiary
A useful calculation to understand the cost of 
a disaster could be based on the amount contrib-
uted per intended beneficiary.  The only database 
that systematically includes beneficiary estimates is 
IFRC’s DMIS. 
The IFRC data shown in the chart below 
demonstrate the average costs per beneficiary and 
provides a useful illustration of the limitations of 
humanitarian response.  Humanitarian response 
strives to be needs-based and impartial.  However, 
we see from the data that the cost/beneficiary in 
providing relief to flood victims is USD 11.99 in 
South Asia, but USD 61.25 in Southeast Asia.  
Why is that?  One plausible explanation is that 
the agency was consistently able to raise more 
funds/beneficiary for victims in Southeast Asia 
than in South Asia, thus the response was not 
impartial.xxxii Will this skewing continue over the 
next twenty years, or will the international system 
develop a funding regime that supports the 
internationally recognized and espoused principles 
of impartiality and proportionality in humanitar-
ian response?  The answer to this will certainly 
affect future costs of humanitarian response.  
 
Critically, the average contribution turns out, 
in most cases, to be significantly different than the 
median.  We can see that, in a few cases since 
1992, a small number of catastrophic events tend 
to skew the averages higher.  If we look at Central 
America, for example, the average total contribu-
tions for a cyclone is USD 61,991,759, but the 
median is actually drastically lower at USD 
1,538,437.  Further, if we remove the response to 
Hurricane Mitch in 1998, the average total 
contributions is much lower, at USD 5,001,619.  
We see this same effect with cyclones in South 
Asia, where the average total contributions is 
USD 18,383,288, but, if we remove the response 
in 2007 to Cyclone Sidr in Bangladesh, the 
average total drops to USD 4,679,202.  That said, 
even in a relatively brief period of time, 1992-
2008, a pattern of catastrophic, highly destructive 
events does occur.  Therefore, we cannot disregard 
these costs and should be prepared for these 
events to continue in the future. 
As discussed above, we must assume that 
actual costs are significantly higher than the 
amount that is donated by the international 
community.  By design, UN appeals and IFRC 
appeals cover different aspects of humanitarian 
response, so in cases where both appeals were 
issued, one would be able to add the two appeals 
without duplicating appeal objectives.  Within our 
data set, United Nations appeals, which aim to 
serve as a comprehensive and consolidated 
compilation of post-disaster needs, are only 51.7% 
Table 1. Data for Figure 8Figure 8. Average total IFRC 
contributions per beneficiary
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One can easily see that estimating disaster cost 
can be quite difficult.  Our data and analysis 
provide a window in to understanding how these 
costs vary from region to region and among 
different types of disasters.  Numerous research 
projects could be, and have been,xxxiii carried out 
to understand the causes or plausible reasons for 
these discrepancies, but it is not within the scope 
of our project to speculate on this issue.  We do, 
however, take these discrepancies into account as 
we project and hypothesize potential future costs.  
The next section, based on this cost analysis and 
estimates from climate change experts, will aim to 
do just that.
The Future Hazardscape 
Model One: Projecting Changes 
In Frequency Of Disasters
What does our quizzing of climatologists tell 
us about the likely future changes in the occur-
rence of extreme weather events leading to 
disasters?  We began by looking to the IPCC 
Fourth Assessment Report to ascertain the impact 
of a 0.2 degree (C) per decade of warming on 
disasters.  The report includes a few case-by-case 
projections and these projections typically look 
ahead to the end of the twenty-first century, 
rather than focusing on the next two decades.  
Therefore, we next turned to the source material 
to determine whether we could improve upon 
simple linear extrapolations from the projections 
given in the IPCC Report.  We found that the 
source texts did not offer specific predictions 
either, but they did provide a basis for making 
very rough estimates for the potential change in 
hydro-meteorological disaster frequency over the 
next two decades. Once we established the rough 
estimates, we submitted them to six leading 
climate scientists for comment and refinement.  
The respondents were willing to offer suggestions, 
but on the condition that their remarks remained 
anonymous, due to the great deal of uncertainty 
in these estimates and also due to the fact that 
none considered themselves an expert on disaster 
forecasting.
Table 2 shows what the impact on disaster 
frequency due to the expected warming could be 
between 2008 and 2030.  To establish a baseline 
number, we totaled the entire number of each 
particular disaster type for which there was an 
international humanitarian response for each 
region during the period 1992-2008, then we 
divided by the total number of years, resulting in a 
total for annual disaster frequency per disaster type 
for each region.  Hydro-meteorological disasters 
that did not elicit a UN appeal were not counted 
(due to the gaps in that data).  The percent 
increase, or decrease, is therefore relative to the 
annual frequency during the baseline period.  
And, again, the figures below assume no deviation 
from current adaptation and disaster preparedness 
measures.
 Southeast Asia South Asia East Africa Central America
FLOODS    
Baseline Frequency (1992-2008) 47 47 26 21
  2.85 2.85 1.58 1.27
LOW IMPACT 0% 0% 0% -5%
Frequency/Year (2030) 2.85 2.85 1.58 1.21
MEDIUM IMPACT 5% 5% 5% 0%
Frequency/Year (2030) 2.99 2.99 1.65 1.27
HIGH IMPACT  10% 10% 10% 5%
Frequency/Year (2030) 3.13 3.13 1.73 1.34
    
Table 2. Estimated effect of climate change on disaster frequency in 2030
Table 2. continues on next page
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Our best-case, low-impact scenario actually 
projects lower total disaster frequency (and 
therefore humanitarian response) compared to the 
baseline period, because climate scientists urged us 
to consider the possibility of less frequent floods 
in Central America.  At the other extreme, the 
high-impact scenario predicts an extra USD 26 
million (in 2006 USD) in annual humanitarian 
contributions in 2030.  
The figure below depicts the total projected 
disaster response contributions for the year 2030 
for each of our impact scenarios.  There is only a 
USD 28 million difference between our low and 
high scenarios for these regions.  The chief reason 
for this narrow gap is that our high estimate is, by 
some standards, still very conservative.
In reality, the future hydro-meteorological 
hazardscape will likely combine some aspects of 
Table 2. (continued from previous page)
Estimated effect of climate change on disaster frequency in 2030
 Southeast Asia South Asia East Africa Central America
DROUGHTS    
Baseline Frequency (1992-2008) 3 7 10 4
Baseline Frequency/Year 0.18 0.42 0.61 0.24
LOW IMPACT 0% 0% 0% 0%
Frequency/Year (2030) 0.18 0.42 0.61 0.24
MEDIUM IMPACT 5% 5% 10% 10%
Frequency/Year (2030) 0.19 0.45 0.67 0.27
HIGH IMPACT  10% 10% 20% 20%
Frequency/Year (2030) 0.20 0.47 0.73 0.29
    
CYCLONES    
Baseline Frequency (1992-2008) 24 14 - 15
Baseline Frequency/Year 1.45 0.85 - 0.91
LOW IMPACT 0% 0% - 0%
Frequency/Year (2030) 1.45 0.85 - 0.91
MEDIUM IMPACT 10% 10% - 10%
Frequency/Year (2030) 1.60 0.93 - 1.00
HIGH IMPACT 20% 20% - 20%
Frequency/Year (2030) 1.75 1.02 - 1.09
Figure 9. Estimated annual disaster contributions—
three scenarios for 2030 for the four target regions
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each scenario; for certain hazards, the high 
scenario may be more accurate, whereas for other 
hazards, our low or medium estimates may be 
more prescient.  For example, average precipita-
tion is expected to decrease in Central America 
for all seasons, which suggests a drier climate and 
increased occurrence of drought.  Complicating 
this assumption, precipitation is likely to be 
distributed over fewer rainy days (especially 
during the hurricane season), which then might 
imply both more drought and also more flooding, 
even with a mean decrease in regional precipita-
tion.xxxiv
Table 2 summarizes the extreme event 
predictions that we developed with the climate 
scientists.  It includes the baseline disaster data and 
the projected change in frequency for each hazard, 
region, and impact scenario.  In nearly each case, 
the low estimate reflects no additional climate 
impact above the current climate signal.  Cyclones 
may begin to pose a threat to East Africa, but, due 
to inadequate data, we did not include this hazard 
for East Africa in this paper.  
Model Two: Projecting Intensity Of 
Future Cyclones And Floods
We projected future financial contributions 
based on the past average figures, assuming 
constant cost per disaster type within each region.  
We did not incorporate existing trends in disaster 
intensity, which some climate scientists considered 
to be too conservative.  If, on the other hand, we 
had factored in an increase in intensity and then 
assumed a cubic relationship between intensity 
increase and damage, our contribution figures 
would be much higher.  For example, had we 
assumed a 15% increase in cyclone intensity, a 
cubic relationship between intensity and impact, 
and no increase in cyclone frequency, our aggre-
gate annual contributions for cyclone disasters 
would rise from USD 88,939,380 to USD 
135,187,858, a 52% increase.xxxv If the increase in 
intensity were coupled with our medium-impact 
scenario for cyclone frequency, becoming 10% 
more frequent, humanitarian contributions for 
cyclones would rise to USD 148,706,643, a 
financing increase of 67%.  See Figure 10 below:
What is clear from this graph is that the 
increase in cyclone intensity impacts the expected 
amount of contributions—the disaster impact—
far more than does an increase in frequency.  And 
remember, these estimates are based on a cubed 
relationship between intensity and impact, a 
conservative assumption compared with those 
discussed by Pielke.xxxvi
What can be said about the possible increase 
in intensity of floods?  Allan and Soden found “a 
distinct link between rainfall extremes and 
temperature, with heavy rain events increasing 
during warm periods and decreasing during cold 
periods.  Furthermore, the observed amplification 
of rainfall extremes is found to be larger than 
predicted by models, implying that projections of 
future changes in rainfall extremes in response to 
anthropogenic global warming may be 
underestimated.”xxxvii
Figure 10. Impact of a 15% increase in cyclone 
intensity on contributions in the four target regions
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The IPCC Report also notes that the poten-
tial for climate change to intensify flood patterns 
may be particularly acute along the coast of East 
Africa.  However, “deriving quantitative estimates 
of the potential costs of the impacts of climate 
change (or those associated with climate variabil-
ity, such as droughts and floods) and costs without 
adaptation is difficult.  Limited availability of data 
and a variety of uncertainties relating to future 
changes in climate, social and economic condi-
tions, and the responses that will be made to 
address those changes, frustrate precise cost and 
economic loss inventories.”xxxviii In South and 
Southeast Asia, more intense rainfall, particularly 
during the summer monsoon, and increased 
glacial melting might lead to more severe flood-
ing.
However, we extended our model to incor-
porate an additional 0.5% increase in flood 
intensity based upon the expected warming 
through 2030 (see Figure 11).  To do so, we relied 
on Fowler and Hennessy, and Allan and Soden, 
who have published on the relationship between 
atmospheric warming and extreme precipitation 
events.  Saturation vapor pressure increases in a 
nonlinear fashion as air temperature rises, roughly 
doubling for every 10 degree (C) increase in the 
range of -20 to 45 degrees.  Fowler and Hen-
nessy’s analysis of global climate models suggested 
a 1.1 to 2.9% increase in global precipitation per 
degree (C) of warming, but, for this to be truly 
predictive, it would have to be downscaled to 
accommodate changes at the regional and sub-
regional level.  What’s more, the actual impact of 
additional extreme precipitation events on flood 
disasters would also need to build upon known 
flood patterns and on the predicted rise in sea 
level and its impact on flooding in coastal areas 
and river deltas, in particular.
In South and Southeast Asia, droughts have 
been increasing, not only in frequency but also in 
intensity, due to warmer temperatures.  It is 
estimated that, under the full range of emissions 
scenarios, 120 million to 1.2 billion people in 
South and Southeast Asia will experience in-
creased water stress by the 2020s.xxxix
Model Three: Projecting International 
Spending On Disasters
For model three, we looked at the relationship 
between total spending on humanitarian response 
and total spending on hydro-meteorological 
disasters.  As Figure 12 shows, the trend over the 
past generation is actually towards less spending 
on climate-related disasters, both as a percentage 
of total spending and in absolute terms!  As 
discussed in the Data and Methodology section, 
interpreting this trend is problematic.  We have no 
way of knowing if contributions to a “socio-eco-
nomic appeal” are to help long-term victims of 
flooding, civil war, or population displacement.  
We therefore have no way of knowing if the 
downward trend in donor funding response to 
weather-related disasters is real or a creation of the 
Figure 11. Estimated impact of flood intensity on humanitarian contributions
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changed reporting criteria.  Once again, this 
highlights the dearth of credible data from the 
humanitarian sector upon which meaningful 
projections may be made.
Model Four: Projecting Trends Of Disaster 
Occurrence And Affected Populations
Finally, working with the CRED EM-DAT 
database of total numbers of disasters recorded and 
people affected, we did a regression analysis from 
1975 to 2008 and calculated a best-fit trend line 
for both a linear and exponential fit. See Figures 
13 and 14.  The linear method projects a 320% 
increase in the number of disasters recorded per 
year over the next twenty years and a 330% 
increase in the numbers of people being affected, 
rising to more than 370 million people per year.  
If this was directly correlated with the costs of 
disaster response, it would imply at least a tripling 
in spending.  The exponential method projects 
more than an eight-fold increase in the numbers 
of disasters and the numbers affected, and hence 
the spending needed (at 2006 prices).  Add in a 
4% a year economic inflation factor and this could 
grow to a near sixteen times increase.
Figure 12. Trends in total and climate-related disaster 
spending in millions Swiss Francs (CHF) (Source: IFRC-DMIS)
Figures 13 and 14. Linear and exponential trends for global disaster 
occurrence and numbers of people affected by disaster
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Table 3 above compares the projections in 
humanitarian response to climate-related disasters, 
twenty years hence, using methods one, two, and 
four above, both without and with inflation 
factored in. 
This is difficult data for policymakers to 
interpret, with a hundred-fold difference in the 
projections from the most to the least conserva-
tive.  There are three things we can say about 
these projections.  First, they demonstrate how 
rudimentary our knowledge still is about the 
linkages between climate change, extreme events, 
disasters, and disaster response.  Most of the 
variance in this system still appears as noise to us, 
thus making it impossible to make accurate 
predictions.  Second, this high degree of uncer-
tainty will be reflected in how the future pans out. 
We should expect to see unforeseen major 
increases in demand for humanitarian assistance 
and thus should attempt to build funding and 
response systems capable of dealing with this 
uncertain environment.  Third, all the scenarios 
project increases in needed spending.  We can say 
with some confidence that we will see more 
climate-related disasters and more need for 
disaster response.
Consequences For Response And 
Preparedness 
The data and projections presented here 
suggest that, over the period of the next twenty 
years, the expected increase in extreme event 
frequency leading to disasters and hence humani-
tarian action will vary region to region and type 
to type, but that, overall, we will likely not see 
more than about a 20% increase—this less than 
the variation in humanitarian funding from year 
to year.  However, when we consider the effect 
increases in intensity will have on disaster impact, 
we see that we may be looking at a 67% increase 
in estimated humanitarian spending on cyclones 
(assuming a 15% increase in cyclone intensity) and 
an additional 0.5% increase on floods (based upon 
the increased water storage capacity of warmer 
air).  If, in turn, we factor in increases in vulner-
ability to disasters, then the figures may go higher 
still.  And if, as we do below, we look at how 
disasters may combine with economic and 
political processes to cause complex crises, cost 
estimates go into the billions.
Even with conservative assumptions, our 
analysis suggests that far more resources will be 
required to maintain even the existing levels of 
preparedness and response.  If we know that 
current levels of contributions are approximately 
50-70% of what is actually appealed for, then 
solely maintaining existing levels would still be 
considered woefully inadequate.  
How prepared is the humanitarian system to 
handle this increase in need?  While a handful of 
organizations have started to explore how climate 
change will impact their work in the longer term, 
few have really begun to tackle the issues of how 
to be more effective with significantly fewer 
resources per emergency or per affected person.  
It is clear that agencies will have to become more 
prepared, more flexible, and better at what they 
do. 
One trend, however, provides encouragement: 
in recent decades, the frequency of hydro-meteo-
rological disasters has been on the rise, but the 
number of fatalities per disaster has been declining 
during that same period.  This may reflect im-
proved early warning systems, particularly for 
cyclones, which have been monitored by satellite 
since the 1980s.xli
As mentioned, any projection of the humani-
tarian cost of disasters needs to take into account 
Table 3. Comparative projected increases in humanitarian spending
  Model one Model two Model four
  Disaster frequency  Frequency and intensityxl Past trend
  prediction -driven prediction-driven projection-driven
At 2006 USD values 16% increase in  67% increase in 800% increase in
  response costs response costs response costs
Assuming 4%  32% increase in 134% increase in 1,600% increase in
annual inflation response costs response costs response costs
December 2008 • The Humanitarian Costs Of Climate Change 21
changes in vulnerability to the life-threatening 
effects of extreme events.  Vulnerability is depen-
dent on a myriad of factors, economic, social, and 
political.  More specifically, we know that com-
munal and state measures taken to mitigate the 
effects of disasters can drastically reduce loss of 
live, property, and livelihoods.
The projections in this paper assume no 
change in state action to reduce the number of 
hydro-meteorological disasters.  We have, however, 
many examples from the past where such action 
has been effective.  We describe three such 
programs here as illustrative of what states could 
do to mitigate the growing threats from climate- 
related disasters.
Many measures that reduce or manage disaster 
risk have already been implemented and have 
mitigated the number of disasters that result from 
extreme weather events during the last two 
decades.  For example, after Typhoon Sisang made 
landfall in the Philippines in 1987, destroying 
more than 200,000 homes, the government 
initiated a program to provide storm-resistant 
housing for those living in the most at-risk parts 
of the country.  During its initial phase (1988-
1991), at least 27,000 storm-resistant shelters were 
built and none were destroyed by storms.  Since 
then, the project has been expanded, while the 
number of cyclones that entered the Philippines’ 
Area of Responsibility rose from roughly sixteen 
to twenty per year from 1990 to 2003.  Precise 
figures on the number of lives and homes saved 
due to this project are not available, but it contin-
ues to be implemented as of our writing.xlii
The Bangladesh Red Crescent Society’s 
Cyclone Preparedness Programme was imple-
mented in the 1960s and is currently active in 
eleven coastal districts.  Volunteers have been 
trained to help with the dissemination of cyclone 
warnings, as well as information about evacuation, 
rescue, first-aid, and emergency relief.  Meteoro-
logical data is collected from the Bangladesh 
Meteorological Department (BMD), which issues 
regular bulletins that are transmitted to the six 
zonal offices and the thirty sub-district offices 
over high-frequency radio.  These offices, in turn, 
pass information to villages, whose unit teams 
spread out and issue cyclone warnings, with each 
unit serving one or two villages with a population 
of about 2,000 to 3,000.xliii 
After Hurricane Mitch, Honduras imple-
mented a multi-sectoral program to reduce 
vulnerability to storms and landslides.  Both 
municipal and federal government agencies have 
taken measures to improve disaster awareness, 
emergency response, early warning systems, hazard 
mapping, risk analysis, and to develop an action 
plan in each municipality to identify investments 
that would further mitigate disasters.  Implement-
ed in 2000, with assistance from the World Bank, 
this project was scaled up in 2007.xliv Programs 
similar to these have been implemented through-
out Southeast Asia, following the 2004 tsunami. 
These examples lead one to ask, is it not more 
beneficial or effective to invest in preparedness 
and mitigation, rather than focusing efforts on 
response?  If activities such as these have the 
potential to dramatically decrease the number of 
people affected and/or the number of deaths, 
perhaps the more effective and cost-effective 
approach, given that we project an increase in the 
frequency and intensity of disasters, is to focus 
efforts on preparedness.
Complexity And Climate Change
The effect of a changing climate will be seen 
in the changing dynamics and dimensions of 
humanitarian crises.  In order to illustrate the 
complexity of potential effects of climate change, 
the following are possible future cases in China and 
Europe.  These cases fall into two categories of 
crisis agent: “cascading impacts” with sequential 
effects from one crisis agent to another; and 
“multi-hazard impacts,” or interactive disaster 
agents, affecting vulnerable populations.  
Possibility One: Cascading Crises In China—
Collapse Of The Three Gorges Dam
In this scenario, China’s massive growth 
through 2010 slows by 2015, harboring excess 
capacity for stagnant global markets.  While 
growth brings heaving cities, a middle class, and a 
migratory workforce discontent with inequalities, 
climate change fatally tests China’s new infrastruc-
ture and society.  Let’s imagine one example of a 
catastrophe in 2015 that could bring cascading 
effects through China, and to the world, as China 
seeks USD 1 billion of international assistance,xlv 
whilst coping with USD 275 billion of  
subsequent costs from efforts to repair political 
and physical damage.  
First, warmer temperatures bring glacial 
floods from the Tibetan plateau and combine with 
extreme precipitation further downstream.xlvi The 
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Three Gorges Dam’s reservoir exceeds capacity, 
and the weight of the water triggers irregular 
seismic activity in one of the six faults that lies 
within twenty kilometers of the dam.xlvii, xlviii Trem-
ors stress the dam wall, causing massive structural 
failure and resulting in floods that destroy Yichang, 
Yidu, and Zhicheng (combined populations of 
over 2.5 million people).xlix The deluge then 
collapses the Gezhouba Dam and breaches the 
Jingjiang Dyke—a hundred thousand people 
could drown.  In total, over 800,000 people would 
be at risk, with approximately 280,000 more 
potentially affected by disease and lack of fresh 
water.  With the Yangtze River Valley thrown into 
chaos, an estimated 8,600,000 are internally 
displaced.  Taking into account lost production, 
the economic cost of such a disaster could reach 
USD 30 billion.l
Add to that the possibility that groups of the 
poor and disaffected, angered at policies that 
allowed the Dam to be completed, respond with 
political protests.  As China’s growth rate slips 
below 8%, discontent mixes with hunger as local 
economies suffer.li The government mobilizes 
200,000 troops to provide aid, but observers also 
see the mobilization as discouraging protest.  
Upheaval leads to a resurgence of a Party 
eager to maintain control, supported by a popula-
tion anxious for stability.  Areas thought to be 
harboring dissidents are overrun by troops, and, in 
the ensuing chaos, over 800 people, mainly 
university students, are killed and nearly 135,000 
severely injured in demonstrations around the 
country.  Nervous foreign investors pull out of 
Shanghai and Shenzhen, reducing the value of 
Chinese companies by USD 2 trillion. 
Rallies and pro-government actions are 
organized that result in the equivalent of 150 
million people absent for ten working days at a 
cost to China’s economy of USD 25 billion.  The 
government, associating instability with market 
freedoms, restores regulations limiting private 
enterprise and ownership, contracting economic 
growth by two percent, reducing China’s output 
by USD 150 billion,lii a high price the govern-
ment believes is worth paying for stability and 
control.  
As economic regulation tightens, prices rise 
and corresponding imports, particularly from 
India, are more affordable, putting China’s facto-
ries at risk.  Cautious of further discontent, 
China’s domestic economic regulations necessitate 
restrictions on international trade.  
This scenario illustrates how one event cascades, 
multiplying the effects of its consequences for the nation 
at large and the international community.  Over 1 
million people would be killed in the collapse of the 
Dam and subsequent disease and political unrest.  
Nearly 4 million people are displaced as government 
forces take to the streets of major cities and towns and 
underemployed, migratory workers are told to return 
home to rural areas.  Even the short slump in production 
resulted in billions of dollars of export earnings lost. 
Possibility Two:  Climate Change In Europe—
Simultaneous Hazards 
With reference to recent major hydro-meteo-
rological events in Europe, this possibility looks at 
the effects, in the summer of 2015, of a large flood 
and heat wave occurring in the same year.liii With 
governments and the public bearing the cost of 
USD 50 billion in damage,liv aid organizations 
contribute USD 100 million in efforts to help 
Europe’s most vulnerable citizens.lv The European 
Union steps in to assist a failing insurance indus-
try, assuming liability for USD 1 trillion of 
perceived uninsurable risk.  
In the summer of 2015, a multi-hazard crisis 
sees wide-scale flooding and a record heat wave 
put compounding pressure on governments and 
relief agencies.lvi The high temperatures stress 
power stations, as demand increases and produc-
tion capacity falls.lvii Governments may be forced 
to ration power,lviii and reducing the statutory 
week by one day for a month would cost upwards 
of USD 100 billion of lost production.lix Subse-
quent heavy rains in Northern Europe solve some 
problems for power generation, but destroy 
critical infrastructure, from power to water 
management.  Floods leave 5 million homes 
without water,lx and bottled water must be 
provided by government services and aid agencies.
lxi Governments are forced to repair and defend 
the increasingly critical infrastructure that re-
mains.lxii
Where the heat wave twelve years before had 
caused an estimated USD 15 billion in losses,lxiii 
the wider scale and longer duration of a 2015 heat 
wave across Europe could cause losses as high as 
USD 35 billion.  Maize yield reduces by 30% and 
fruit harvests decline by 25% from France to 
Poland.lxiv Governments struggling to control 
inflation block commensurate increases in wages; 
protests across Europe reflect the civil unrest of 
the 1970s.  Five days of strikes by manufacturers 
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and public sector workers cost the European 
economy USD 30 billion.  
A new crisis emerges as insurers withdraw 
coverage from vulnerable households and indus-
trial sectors.  Private insurers find themselves 
unable to protect individuals from risk, and 
governments become the “insurer of last resort.”  
With the value of asset risks nationalized poten-
tially exceeding USD 1 trillion in the UK and 
Netherlands alone,lxv governments seek the 
combined strength of the EU to cope.lxvi
Health effects of high temperatures and flood-
ing in Europe could be severe, with the elderly 
and the young most vulnerable.  Europe’s older 
demographic suffer severely with as many as 
50,000 excess deaths.lxvii Salmonella outbreaks 
occur across Europe as cold storage systems are 
found to be inadequate.  The stagnant water of 
subsequent floods and high temperatures bring 
disease-carrying vectors such as the tiger mos-
quito.  To combat the spread of such vectors, 
pesticides are sprayed across swathes of Northern 
Europe, and the destruction of indigenous species 
brings environmental catastrophe as governments 
attempt to tame an “unfamiliar world.”  
This scenario of Europe afflicted by multiple 
hazards suggests how extreme weather can reveal 
underlying vulnerability.  Demographic vulnerability is 
seen in a lack of support systems for the elderly; systemic 
vulnerability is exposed in the destruction of expensive 
yet unprotected infrastructure.  The expectation falls on 
the government and aid agencies in Europe to rescue a 
struggling system, but assumes that public bodies will 
have the resources and preparation to do so.  
So What? 
These scenarios describe far-reaching, yet 
plausible, humanitarian catastrophes triggered in 
part by climate change.  More frequent severe and 
extreme weather conditions will reveal uneven 
vulnerability to climate change, with resonating 
impacts that reflect global society’s interconnect-
edness.lxviii Indicative costs have been ascribed to 
these possibilities; yet, impacts of climate change 
could be nonlinear, as increases in frequency and 
extremity ratchet upwards the cost of vulnerabil-
ity.  Disasters involving multiple hazards or 
cascading consequences may become the norm 
for hazard effects.  Greater frequency of weather 
extremes may come to blur distinctions between 
reconstruction and relief assistance as the time 
between rescue and recovery is squeezed.lxix By 
way of example, the strongest cyclone recorded in 
the Gulf of Mexico to date is not Hurricane 
Katrina, but Hurricane Rita.  Rita made landfall 
on 24 September 2005, before New Orleans 
could reopen, narrowly missing the city that had 
exhibited both of the categories of crisis effects 
described above. 
Future Research Needs And 
Application Issues
This work is very much a first attempt.  In 
writing it, we have become aware of just how 
poorly the issue of humanitarian costs, and 
particularly the relationship with climate change, 
has been documented and researched.
• First, and we keep emphasizing the point, 
 more rigorous collection of disaster related 
 data is required. While projecting into the 
 future is a difficult task, current levels of data 
 do not even provide a full picture of what is 
 going on now nor what has gone on in the 
 past.  There is no internationally-agreed 
 standard for collecting data on humanitarian 
 response and no single recognized repository 
 for such data.  If we are to refine our models 
 of future humanitarian crises and their costs, 
 then creating a more useful global database is 
 essential.  We have the beginnings of such a 
 database in the present UN-FTS, IFRC, and 
 EM-DAT databases. However, a unified, 
 comprehensive, properly-serviced and 
 maintained, publicly accessible database is 
 urgently needed. 
• Once better data are available, more research 
 is needed into the relationship among 
 hazards, vulnerability, climate change, and 
 humanitarian response. Without grounding 
 our work with information about what is 
 really taking place, we essentially face the 
 future with plenty of passion but precious 
 little evidence.  
• Portions of this report focus on large regions 
 in order derive a potential global estimate for 
 climate disaster contributions.  Future 
 research that focuses on a smaller sub-region 
 would enable one to detect trends, and 
 possibly make a more refined correlation 
 between past precipitation trends and disaster 
 frequency/intensity.  For example, one might 
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 focus on past drought data for the Horn of 
 Africa, examine monthly rainfall totals, and 
 then compare the historical record with 
 future seasonal precipitation estimates.
• As highlighted earlier in this paper, the true 
 cost of a disaster, in terms of both the 
 immediate and long-term economic losses 
 to the affected populations, and any measure 
 of the efforts expended by local populations 
 and their authorities to provide relief for 
 disaster victims, is under-researched and 
 hence under-reported.  We report what is 
 available, the international response, 
 presenting it as though it were the totality 
 of response.  This is a deeply biased picture.  
 Research is urgently needed, therefore, to 
 gauge the true cost of disasters.  We would 
 suggest starting with a case history approach, 
 using field research, in the wake of a 
 representative series of disasters, to estimate 
 both the true local cost of the disaster and 
 the local spending on disaster response.  
 Once such a series of case histories are in 
 place, it will be possible to move to deriving 
 and testing conceptual models to describe 
 the costs of disasters in a more general and 
 accurate way.
• The IPCC Fourth Assessment Report 
 indicates that regional predictions would 
 benefit from increased use and improvement 
 of regional climate models.  In Central 
 America, for example, regional models are 
 still being tested and developed; relatively 
 few studies have used these models, and those 
 that do are constrained by short simulation 
 length.  In short, the report argues, “both 
 more realistic [global climate models] forcing 
 and improvements in the [regional climate 
 models] are needed.”lxx Estimating disaster 
 frequency from the extreme tail end of these 
 models may always pose a challenge, but the 
 accuracy of future humanitarian spending 
 calculations could be improved if one were 
 able to incorporate the expected increases in 
 hazard intensity, particularly for regions that 
 are exposed to multiple climate hazards.  
 These estimates could be refined further 
 with more precise knowledge about the 
 relationship between a hazard’s intensity and 
 its impact.
• The two possibilities presented here to show 
 the effect of sequential and simultaneous 
 hazards provide a hint of how climate-related 
 disasters may generate costs far beyond those 
 suggested by projections of today’s disaster 
 costs.  These projections are, however, as 
 much thought experiments as anything else, 
 and are projections, not predictions.  To make 
 them more predictive, we would need more 
 detailed country or sub-country level 
 research to explore the linkages between 
 multiple hazards, economic stability, and 
 political action.  While potential case studies 
 are useful to highlight vulnerabilities, 
 systematic efforts are needed to better 
 identify risks around these issues and plan 
 for the future.    
• The prospect of multiple hazards and reduced 
 periods of recovery between extreme events 
 has far-reaching implications that necessitate 
 increased research and attention in both 
 modeling and development policy.  Shorter 
 recovery periods will exacerbate vulnerability 
 to future shocks (both climatic and 
 non-climatic), suggesting that our assumed 
 linear relationship between increasing hazards 
 and disasters may significantly underestimate 
 future humanitarian impacts and costs.  This 
 requires an integrated approach for long-term 
 development and humanitarian policy.  
 Disaster risk reduction and recovery/
 reconstruction are currently “grey transition” 
 areas that more often than not fall between 
 the cracks of development and humanitarian 
 responsibilities, but will become ever more 
 important for both.  Existing policy and 
 program divides between the two will 
 become increasingly problematic and 
 artificial. Current and future efforts to bridge 
 this divide are essential and should be expanded. 
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Conclusions
While this paper has only skimmed the 
surface of the relationship between climate change 
and humanitarian costs, we can draw some 
tentative conclusions.
First, regarding potential future costs of 
humanitarian response, our analysis found that the 
most conservative models still indicate a predict-
able and severe increase in costs of disasters, even 
within the next twenty years. At a minimum, we 
project an increase of spending on climate-related 
disasters in sample regions of USD 57 million.  
The worst-case maximum projection yields a rise 
of over USD 2.7 billion in international climate-
related disaster response.  What we cannot say 
with certainty is where in this range the actual 
costs will lie or what shape this increase will take.  
The data and, therefore, models simply do not 
exist to determine what the “right” projection 
would be, while they do demonstrate that current 
funding is not impartial or proportional.  If we 
know that there will be a significant increase in 
costs, but cannot know with certainty where or 
how much this increase will be and what it will 
entail, there is every reason to develop a more 
integrated and proactive method of financing 
disaster response.  At present, national disaster 
response is left up to each state.  In a global 
economy, this is clearly becoming less and less 
acceptable. Within large, federated state bodies 
such as the United States or the European Union, 
mechanisms are in place to ensure individual states 
“do their bit.”  The creation and enhancement of 
adequate and well-supported standby funding 
mechanisms would be one significant way to 
enable humanitarian agencies to respond more 
predictably and flexibly in response to future 
unknown needs.    
Second, regarding the complexity of future 
disasters, this research demonstrates the linkages 
among climate change, politics, and disasters.  An 
increase in frequency and intensity of severe and 
extreme weather events will impact the vulner-
ability of individuals and communities, with broad 
implications for our increasingly interconnected 
world.  Implications of climate change highlight 
the relevance of the relationship between politics 
and disasters.  Cascading or multi-hazard events 
provide just a couple of examples of how costs 
from disasters can easily escalate.  They also 
highlight the usefulness of efforts to understand 
and respond to the linkages between disasters and 
politics. 
Ultimately, it is the ability of individual 
households to protect themselves against the 
physical and economic shock of disaster that will 
make the difference between survival and failure.  
With appropriate planning, states can profoundly 
alter the environment within which individuals 
act.  They can encourage and inform.  They can 
provide the infrastructure of physical protection 
and response, as we have seen in Bangladesh.  
They can regulate to encourage the innovative use 
of insurance and partnership between the private 
sector and the state.  Or they can do nothing. 
Third, there is an overwhelming need for 
more research.  The ability to do this research will 
depend, as discussed above, on improving the 
availability of data and the databases on humani-
tarian response.  This information is a public good 
and should be prioritized as such.  Common 
definitions and standards of rigor and reporting 
need to be established and implemented across the 
board.  With access to improved information, 
research should be supported that aims to under-
stand the complex linkages related to disasters and 
climate change.  Further, research aimed toward 
understanding climate change impacts at the 
country and sub-regional levels may provide 
greater levels of certainty than the regional 
approach taken in this research.   
Lastly, there is a need for greater dialogue, 
knowledge sharing, and collaboration between the 
climate change community and the humanitarian 
community.  While a few mechanisms and plat-
forms have been established to promote greater 
cooperation, there is a long way to go and much 
to learn from one another.  Present mechanisms 
may prove to be sufficient, but should aim to 
bring in more partners, including regional and 
country-level representatives.   
The decisions we take now on how humani-
tarian response is organized and funded and 
regarding how we work with disaster-prone 
populations and with each other will determine 
how many lives are lost, how many livelihoods are 
devastated, and how much national wealth is 
washed away two decades from now, let alone 
how much we are forced to spend on humanitar-
ian response.  We hope this paper has been a first 
step in highlighting the importance of making 
these decisions and doing so from the basis of 
evidence, rather than simply speculation.
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